I Name My Price But Don't Want The Prize: Effects Of Seemingly Useful Information In The Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanism


Joni L. Jones
Kevin K.Y. Kuan
Sandra K. Newton


This study investigates the effects of information provision on decision-making in an e-commerce model, the name-your-own-price mechanism, capitalizing on information asymmetry and quality uncertainty. Despite the potential benefits of this mechanism to both sellers and buyers, evidence suggests that buyers may fall prey to the winner’s curse. Using a controlled experiment, two types of information provision, bid outcomes and bid recommendations, are manipulated to assist buyers’ decisions. Subjects provided with accepted and rejected bid outcomes performed worse than subjects provided with only accepted bid outcomes. Furthermore, subjects provided with bid recommendations initially reacted to the information by bidding higher but subsequently learned to assimilate the information reducing the winner’s curse. The findings provide interesting insights on how a potentially advantageous e-commerce model can be negatively affected by the suboptimal decisions of consumers.

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November, 2006

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